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 
Abstract — This paper investigates the effectiveness of 
reducing errors in management accounting systems with respect 
to organizational performance. In particular, different basic 
design options of management accounting systems of how to 
improve the information base by measurements of actual values 
are analyzed in different organizational contexts. The paper 
applies an agent-based simulation based on the idea of NK fitness 
landscapes. The results provide broad, but no universal support 
for conventional wisdom that lower inaccuracies of accounting 
information lead to more effective adaptation processes. 
Furthermore, results indicate that the effectiveness of improving 
the management accounting system subtly interferes with the 
complexity of the interactions within the organization and the 
coordination mode applied. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
ANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING is intended to provide 
decision-makers with judgmental information for 
evaluating options and to produce information for assessing 
managerial performance [1], [2].. For deciding whether, or not, 
to change the status quo in favor of an alternative option, a 
decision-maker requires information on the pay-offs of both 
options. Information related to the status quo may result from 
measurements of actual values (i.e., “weighting”, “counting” 
and valuing) within accounting systems; and unfortunately, it 
cannot be taken for granted that these measurements perfectly 
reflect reality [3]. The alternative options, in principle, are 
subject to ex ante-evaluations by decision-makers who, 
according to Simon [4] may suffer from cognitive limitations. 
However, also ex ante-evaluations might be based on 
measurements, i.e., actual values received on basis of 
decisions made in former periods and used to “learn” for 
future decisions. For instance, plan cost accounting often relies 
on cost functions which are built from actual costs realized in 
former periods [5] - or as Christensen} [3]  puts it: “[o]nly 
autocorrelation makes historical accounting relevant for 
decision purposes” (p. 1827). 
Moreover, management accounting systems are embedded 
 
 
in an organizational structure and the organizational structure 
affects imperfections of judgmental information. In particular, 
in organizations the overall decision problem is segmented 
into partial decisions which are delegated to decentral 
decision-makers (e.g., [6]-[8]). With delegation further 
difficulties occur: partial decisions may be interdependent, 
decision-makers likely have different information and pursue 
their own objectives opportunistically. To avoid losses with 
respect to the organization's performance, coordination is 
required, though, according to Ackoff [9], more intense 
coordination not necessarily increases organizational 
performance.  
Against this background the paper investigates the following 
research question: In which settings of organizational 
structure and basic design options of the management 
accounting system it is effective to use measured actual values 
by management accounting systems for improving judgmental 
information? 
Hence, the paper focuses on imperfect knowledge of pay-off 
functions in organizations. The paper does not address 
decision-making under uncertainty due to imperfectly known 
future events [10]. Furthermore, the paper does not consider 
the diverse biases and heuristics that individuals suffer from in 
case of uncertainty [11]. We regard accounting errors in terms 
of noise as the difference between estimated and correct 
values [12]. [13]; however, the paper does not relate to biases 
in accounting in terms of the application of accounting 
principles that is not in line with the accounting principles.   
For investigating the research question, a method is required 
that allows controlling a multitude of issues in interaction with 
each other like interdependent decisions, coordination 
mechanisms, inaccuracies of judgmental information and 
related adjustments due to measurement of actual values by 
accounting. Obviously, these interrelated issues would be 
particularly difficult to control in empirical research and would 
induce intractable dimensions in formal modeling. In contrast, 
simulation methods allow dealing with manifold inter-
dependent issues [14]. Since the research question focuses on 
collaborative decision-making an agent-based simulation 
appears appropriate. 
The paper contributes to research since, to the best of the 
author's knowledge, for the first time different settings of 
memorizing actual values and dynamic adjustments through 
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actual values in management accounting are investigated in 
interaction with major organizational design variables. 
Moreover, using an agent-based method is a relatively new 
approach in the area of management accounting ([15)-[18]). 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: 
Section II places the research question within the context of 
related literature. In the third chapter we introduce the 
simulation model and in Section IV we present and discuss 
results of the simulations.  
II. RELATED LITERATURE IN ACCOUNTING AND ORGANIZATION 
SCIENCE 
The research question of this article obviously refers to the 
body of research on errors in accounting. However, our study 
might also be seen in the context of research on a more general 
question: how does organizational design influence the overall 
outcome of an organization with decision-makers imperfectly 
informed about the outcome of alternatives? Subsequently, we 
outline these streams of research with respect to the research 
question addressed in this paper. 
A. Errors in Accounting 
Christensen [3] gives a recent overview and discussion on 
errors in accounting. Stating that errors in accounting are 
“often neglected when the design of accounting systems is 
evaluated” (p. 1836) he elaborates three dimensions of this 
subject. Firstly, accounting information serves to update 
expectations of future events of the firm (e.g., future costs, 
cash flows). In this sense accounting is a source of learning 
and, in particular, allows updating beliefs. Thus, the main 
question is whether the accuracy of information known 
beforehand and the accounting information leads to more 
reliable expectations about future events.  
Secondly, Christensen [3] points out that particularly cost 
accounting in various contexts is based on linear cost functions 
and that linearity does not necessarily reflect reality perfectly. 
Thus, the accounting system suffers from an endogenous error. 
This line of argumentation also relates to the findings of Datar 
and Gupta [19] who analyze the effects of erroneous choices 
of cost drivers in product costing and to the findings of Labro 
and Vanhoucke [20] related to the interactions among errors in 
activity based costing. Recently, Leitner [16], [17] investigates 
interactions among errors and biases in traditional costing 
systems.  
Thirdly, Christensen [3] states that accounting information 
not necessarily is the best sort of information for a certain 
purpose and that, for example, the price mechanism might 
reveal better condensed information. In this sense, applying 
accounting systems rather than, for example, the market 
mechanism is the erroneous choice.   
B. Imperfect Information on Pay-Off in Organizations 
The seminal work of Sah and Stiglitz [21]-[23] may be 
regarded as the starting point of the stream of research which 
investigates the robustness of different organizational 
structures against so-called type I and type II errors: In 
analogy to statistical inference, imperfect information used in 
decision-making basically can lead to two different types of 
errors: in case of “type I errors” an option that, in fact, is 
superior compared to the status quo is rejected due to a false 
negative ex ante-evaluation. In contrary, with “type II errors” a 
false positive option is chosen since it is perceived to be 
superior to the status quo, whereas, in fact, it is inferior.  
 
In their 1986 paper Sah and Stiglitz [22] introduce a 
project-selection-framework: An organization consists of 
several decision-making units which receive knowledge of 
feasible projects. Imperfect ex ante-evaluations could occur in 
case that a “good'” project which, in fact, would increase 
organizational performance is rejected (type I error) or if a 
“bad” project which, in fact, reduces organizational 
performance is accepted (type II error). Each decision-making 
unit is characterized by a screening function. The screening 
function gives the probability that a project is accepted as a 
function of the project's quality, i.e., the project's contribution 
to performance.  
Sah and Stiglitz [22] distinguish two “architectures” of the 
decision-making organization: polyarchy and hierarchy. In the 
polyarchy, each decision-maker can decide in favor of a 
project independent from other decision-makers. In the 
hierarchy, in case that a decision-maker on a lower level 
positively evaluates a project, the project proposal has to be 
forwarded to a decision-making unit of a higher level. Thus, 
for acceptance in a two-level hierarchy, a project has to be 
positively evaluated twice. Sah and Stiglitz [22] show that the 
hierarchy reduces the likelihood that projects are accepted 
which better should have been rejected, i.e., hierarchies reduce 
type II errors; in contrary, in a polyarchic structure the 
tendency to falsely reject “good” projects, i.e., the occurrence 
of type I errors, is reduced.  
The works of Sah and Stiglitz initiated further research on 
the decision-making properties of hierarchical versus 
polyarchic organizations. For example, Koh [24], [25] 
introduces costs for information gathering and processing on 
the decision-makers site and information asymmetries related 
to the decision-makers actions into the project-selection-
framework. In the study of Visser [26] the decision-making 
units do not suffer from errors in their judgments but rather 
from obstacles to fully communicate the information they have 
to other decision-making units. Christensen and Knudsen [27] 
extend the work of Sah and Stiglitz [21]-[23] by investigating 
the range of organizational structures between polyarchy and 
hierarchy and provide a general framework for designing 
decision-making structures that most effectively reduce type-I 
and type-II errors. 
It is worth mentioning that some aspects of complex 
decentralized decision-making systems might differ from the 
project-selection-framework of Sah and Stiglitz: the projects 
under evaluation are independent from each other, i.e., no 
interactions between the single project options (or decisions) 
exist. However, there are also decision problems which cannot 
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be segmented without inducing interactions among partial 
decisions and, to some extent, interactions are a consequence 
of specialization. The approach presented subsequently takes 
segmented decisions with interactions among partial decisions 
into account. 
III. SIMULATION MODEL 
The simulation model is based on the NK model introduced 
by Kauffman [28], [29] of evolutionary biology and 
successfully applied in management research (e.g. [30]-[32], 
for an overview [33]). The NK model allows representing a 
multi-dimensional decision problem where N denotes the 
number of dimensions and K the level of interactions among 
these dimensions. However, so far the NK model has rarely 
been employed to analyze decision-making with imperfect 
judgmental information [15], [18], [34].  
We adopt an advanced version of the NK model with noisy 
fitness landscapes, as introduced by Levitan and Kauffman 
[34]. In particular, to analyze our research question the model 
consists of three components which are presented in the 
subsequent sections: (1) the organizational structure which is 
mapped similar to Siggelkow and Rivkin [31]; (2) a 
representation of imperfect judgmental information that 
corresponds to organizational segmentation and specialization; 
(3) alternative modes of how inaccuracies in judgmental 
information might be reduced in the course of the adaptive 
walks by measurements by the management accounting 
system. Thus, the components (2) und (3) are regarded to be 
the distinctive features of the model. 
A. Organizational Structure 
In each time step t of the overall observation period T the 
artificial organizations face an N-dimensional binary decision 
problem dt = (dt,1,…dt,N), i.e., they have to make decisions dt,i 
 {0, 1} and i = 1,…N. Each single state of decision dt,i 
provides a contribution Ct,i with 0 ≤ Ct,i ≤ 1 to organizational 
performance V(dt). A decision dt,i might interact with K other 
decisions (for simplicity K assumed to be stable over time). 
Hence, K can take values from 0 (no interactions) to N-1 
(maximum interactions). Thus, performance contribution Ct,i 
may not only depend on the single decision dt,i but also on K 
other decisions so that  
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In line with the NK model, we assume that for each possible 
vector 
K
ititit ddd ,
1
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a uniform distribution over the unit interval, i.e., U[0,1]. 
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Our organizations consist of a main office and R 
departments subscripted by r. Each department has a 
department head. Our organizations segment their N-
dimensional decision problem d into R disjoint partial 
problems and delegate each partial problem to one of the R 
departments. Hence, each department has primary control over 
a subset of the N single decisions dt,i (e.g., in case of N = 10 
and R = 3 department 1 over decisions 1 to 3, department 2 
over decisions 4 to 7 and department 3 over decisions 8 to 10), 
and from the perspective of a certain department r the 
organizational decision problem is partitioned into a partial 
decision vector ownrt,d  related to those single decisions which 
are in the “own” responsibility and into resrt,d  for the “residual” 
decisions that other departments are in charge of. However, in 
case of cross-departmental interactions, choices of a certain 
department may affect the contributions of decisions other 
departments are in charge of and vice versa.  
In each period t of the adaptive walk a department head 
seeks to identify the best configuration for the “own” subset of 
choices assuming that the other departments q = 1,…R and 
q ≠ r do not alter their prior subsets ownqt
*
,1d of decisions. In each 
time period a department head randomly discovers two 
alternative partial configurations of those binary decisions that 
he/she is in charge of: an alternative configuration 
1
,
a
rtd  that 
differs in one decision (a1) and another alternative 
2
,
a
rtd  which 
differs in two decisions (a2) compared to the status quo, i.e., 
own
rt
*
,1d . In each time period department head has three options 
to choose from, i.e., keeping the status quo ownrt
*
,1d  and the two 
alternatives 1,
a
rtd , 
2
,
a
rtd . According to economic literature, a 
department head favors that option which he/she perceives to 
promise the highest value base for compensation. In our model 
department heads are compensated on basis of the overall 
performance of the organization according to a linear incentive 
scheme so that we can ignore conflicts of interests between the 
organizational and departmental objectives.  
However, due to specialization our department heads have 
different knowledge about the organization's decision problem 
dt (we return to that point in the section III.B). In consequence, 
even though in our model no conflicts of interests occur, 
departments can have different preferences which might evoke 
a need for coordination. We analyze two different modes of 
coordination (for these and other modes [31], [36]):  
 ─ In the “decentral” mode, in fact, there is no 
coordination: each department autonomously makes the “own” 
partial decisions 
own
rt,d  and the overall configuration dt of 
decisions results as a combination of these departmental 
choices without any central intervention. Hence, the function 
of the main office is limited to (perhaps inaccurately) 
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observing the overall performance achieved. 
  ─ In a mode named “proposal” each department 
proposes two alternative configurations dt to the main office 
and, among all proposals received, the main office finally 
chooses the one that promises the highest overall performance. 
Hence, by their proposals the departments shape the search 
space of the main office. 
B. Informational Structure 
Our agents identify superior solutions of the decisional 
problem according to the perceived contributions of the 
choices to their compensation or to overall performance, 
respectively. To represent inaccurate judgmental information - 
which might be improved due the management accounting 
system in the course of the adaptive walk (Section III.C) - we 
add noise on the contributions of decisions to performance. 
Furthermore, in order to represent expertise related to 
segmentation and specialization we differentiate noise 
according to the information quality different decision-makers 
in an organization reasonably have. A common idea of many 
organizational theories is that decision-makers in organizations 
dispose of information with different levels of imperfections 
(e.g. [7], [8]). For example, departmental decision-makers are 
assumed to have relatively precise information about their own 
area of competence, but limited cross-departmental knowledge 
whereas the main office might have rather coarse-grained, but 
organization-wide information. 
We assume that departments decide on basis of the 
perceived value base for compensation, i.e., the perceived 
overall performance rather than the actual. Therefore, we 
“distort” the actual performance contributions according to the 
expertise of each single department. In particular, the 
perceived value base for compensation, i.e., the overall 
performance )(
~
, trtV d  department r perceives, is computed as 
normalized sum of the actual own performance and actual 
residual performance, each distorted with an error term 
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Likewise, in the coordination mode “proposal” the main 
office makes a choice from the proposals on basis of the 
perceived overall performance )(
~
ttV d  computed as the sum of 
the true overall performance Vt(dt) and an error term emain(dt).  
At least with respect to accounting systems [20], it is 
reasonable to assume that high (low) true values of 
performance come along with high (low) distortions. Hence, 
we reflect distortions as relative errors imputed to the true 
performance (for other functions [35]). , and, for simplicity, 
the error terms follow a Gaussian distribution N(;) with 
expected value  = 0 and standard deviations ownr , 
res
r  and 
main . For example, department r perceives the “own” 
performance as  
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We differentiate the standard deviations according to 
specialization of departments and the main office as mentioned 
above (see notes on parameter settings in Table 2). 
C. Basic Design Options of the Management Accounting 
Systems 
As argued in the introduction, within the search for higher 
levels of performance ex ante-evaluations might suffer from 
two deficiencies: The performance of the status quo option is 
misestimated and/or the performances of alternative options 
are inaccurately evaluated. This paper is particularly interested 
in the potentially beneficial role that measurements of the 
status quo by accounting systems can play for organizational 
performance. In our model, we therefore distinguish five 
settings of measurement and usage of actual values in the 
adaptive walk (summarized in Table 2) which may be regarded 
as basic design options of the management accounting system:  
 
 
1) In case that “no measurement” is used the evaluation of 
the status quo configuration (i.e., the choice * 1id made in 
period t-1) cannot be based on the measurement of the 
actual values achieved in the previous period. In a way, 
this reflects an organization which does not have any 
accounting system at all. 
2) In a setting we call “measurement only” our departments 
use accounting systems which allow them to perfectly 
determine the performance that was achieved with the 
status quo configuration * 1id  of the decisional vector. 
Hence, throughout each adaptive walk, when department 
heads decide they perfectly get informed about the status 
quo by the accounting system. However, they suffer from 
inaccurate knowledge of the performance contributions of 
the alternative options 
1
,
a
rtd  and 
2
,
a
rtd , that they consider, 
i.e., the accounting system does not provide any refined 
information on the alternatives regardless of whether they 
have been implemented in the past or not. Thus, the 
accounting system does not provide any tracking or 
memory about the configurations that have been realized 
TABLE I 
SETTINGS OF MEASUREMENT AND USAGE OF ACTUALS IN THE ADAPTIVE 
WALKS 
 
Name of Setting 
Measurement of 
Actuals for Status Quo 
Adjustment of  
Inaccuracies in 
Adaptive Walk 
(1)  No measurement no no 
(2)  Measurement only yes no 
(3)  Stepwise 
refinement 
yes stepwise 
(4)  Immediate 
adjustment 
yes 
immediately at 
once 
(5)  Perfect evaluation yes (not necessary) 
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or any information for updating of beliefs (s. section II.A) 
on the alternative options. 
3) A setting we name “stepwise refinement” goes a step 
further. Like in the previously described setting the 
decision-makers get perfect information about the 
performance of the status quo * 1id , and, additionally, the 
measured actual values are used for some kind of 
“learning”. Hence, the management accounting system is 
used for updating of beliefs on alternative options 
according to [3]. For simplicity the stepwise refinement is 
represented in a relatively “mechanistic” form of noise 
reduction: whenever a certain configuration d of decisions 
has been implemented, decision-makers receive 
information about the related contributions to 
performance measures. This information will be partially 
memorized in future periods, and, in particular, will then 
lead to a refined estimation of performance of that 
configuration. This situation, for example, reflects a 
situation where cost functions applied for cost planning 
might be (even automatically) adjusted with each 
measurement of the performance that a certain 
configuration of cost drivers provides: with each 
determined combination of cost drivers and cost measures 
the statistical basis is broadened from which a cost 
function could be derived (for example by regression 
analysis). For each of the n = 2N configurations 
d = (d1,…dN)  in the solution space (due to di  {0, 1} and 
i = 1,…N) a counter countn is introduced. Whenever a 
certain configuration d* is chosen/implemented during the 
observation period T the related counter countd* of 
configuration d* is incremented by 1. Hence, if the 
performance contributions of this configuration d* are 
evaluated again in a later period the corresponding errors 
own
re , 
res
re  and maine  are divided by count
d*. Thus, for 
example, when under coordination mode “proposal” the 
main office again evaluates configuration dt the main 
office perceives the overall performance as   
 ))(
1
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t
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4) The case “immediate adjustment” slightly differs from the 
“stepwise refinement” setting as the accounting systems 
provide perfect memorizing and immediate correction of 
ex ante-evaluations due to measured actual values for a 
configuration d* that has been implemented. Hence, 
whenever in the adaptive walk a configuration is 
considered, which has already been implemented, at least 
once, during the walk, the decision-makers get perfect 
information about the level of performance as measured 
by the accounting system. For example, the main office 
evaluates the overall performance of a configuration dt as  
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5) Perfect evaluations in our simulations serve as a 
“benchmark” so that performance differences due to 
imperfect evaluations can be determined. Here neither the 
evaluations of the status quo * 1id  nor of the alternative 
options 1,
a
rtd  or 
2
,
a
rtd  suffer from any noise, i.e., all error 
terms are set to zero.  
IV. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
A. Parameter Settings in the Simulation Experiments and 
Measures for Effectiveness 
For simulating an adaptive walk, after a “true” fitness 
landscape is generated, distortions are added which follow the 
informational imperfections in the organization as described in 
section III.B. Then the organizations are placed randomly in 
the fitness landscape and observed for 300 periods while 
searching for higher levels of organizational performance 
under the regime of various settings of management 
accounting systems as introduced in section III.C. As is 
familiar for adaptive walks we use a hill-climbing algorithm. 
In particular, each decision maker evaluates the options he/she 
knows (i.e., status quo and alternatives) and an alteration is 
preferred in favor of that option which promises the steepest 
ascent. 
The results were conducted for two interaction structures of 
decisions (i.e., coordination needs) which, in a way, represent 
two extremes (for these and other interaction structures see 
[32]): in the low complexity case intra-departmental 
interactions among decisions are maximal intense while no 
cross-departmental interdependencies exist. This type of 
interactions corresponds to a “self-contained” organization 
structure [7] and comes close to a pooled interdependence 
[37], [38]. In contrast, in the high complexity case all 
decisions affect the performance contributions of all other 
decisions, i.e., the complexity of interactions and the 
coordination need is raised to maximum. This situation comes 
closest to a reciprocal interdependence [37], [38].  
Empirical findings report errors of judgmental information 
between 5 up to 30 percent [39], [40]. Results presented in this 
paper relate to errors around 10 percent though differentiated 
due to specialization as described in section III.B and as 
explicated in the note to Table 2. (It is worth mentioning, that 
results were subject to robustness analyses, especially with 
respect to the magnitude of errors and the spread between 
knowledge about the “own” area of competence and the rest of 
the organization. We found that the results appear robust in a 
range up to a magnitude of overall error around 22 percent and 
with several levels of spread according to specialization of 
decision-makers.)  
For investigating the effectiveness of the adaptive walks we 
rely on three measures as displayed in Table 2: “Speed 
(V5─V1)” reports the performance enhancements achieved in 
the first 5 periods within the adaptive walks. This measure 
appears interesting because in the first periods most purely the 
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effects of refinements (settings 3 and 4) can be observed. The 
performance in the last observation period V300 can serve as an 
indicator for the effectiveness of the search process as well as 
the frequency of how often the global maximum in the 
performance landscape is achieved in the last period observed.  
Furthermore, Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 reflect the performance 
differences in the course of the adaptive walks of the noisy 
against the perfect evaluations for low and high complexity of 
cross-departmental interactions. 
We discuss results in two steps. Firstly, we focus on 
comparing the different settings of measuring and using actuals 
against each other (Section IV.B) and afterwards we discuss 
the moderating effects of complexity and coordination 
(Section IV.C). 
B. Effectiveness of Various Settings of Management 
Accounting Systems 
Obviously, evaluating alternative options with imperfect 
information can result in a choice which appears favorable, 
whereas, in fact, it reduces performance compared to the status 
quo (“false positive” decision) [35]. Underestimating the status 
quo level of performance due to missing or imperfect 
measurement of actuals might foster the false estimation.  Vice 
versa, with “false negative” decisions an alternative is rejected 
because its marginal contribution to performance compared to 
the status quo appears worse than it actually is and, thus, the 
status quo is perpetuated [35]. This situation may be fostered 
by an overestimation of the status quo level of performance. 
These considerations let us hypothesize the following:  
With increasing levels of measurement and usage of actual 
values for improving judgmental information (1) the speed of 
performance enhancements increases and (2) higher levels of 
organizational performance are achieved. 
The five settings of management accounting systems in 
terms of measuring actual values and using these numbers for 
judgments as displayed in table 1 incorporate an order of 
increasing information accuracy. We find that the speed 
measure (V5─V1) in Table 2 in most cases is increasing with the 
more advanced settings of accounting systems. Furthermore, as 
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show at a glance, the more advanced settings 
of management accounting systems tend to have lower 
performance losses against the perfect system. However, the 
results provide broad, but no universal support for the 
hypothesis stated above and some of the results deserve a 
closer analysis. 
First of all, it is worth mentioning that under setting (1) 
where no actual numbers are available at all, the performance 
achieved is lowest in all of the four scenarios of coordination 
need and mode -- in three scenarios with remarkable 
performance losses even to the “measurement only” setting 
(we discuss the “high complexity-proposal mode”-scenario 
below more into detail). Apparently, over- or underestimating 
the status quo leads to severe losses of speed and level of 
performance enhancements. Hence, this indicates that using 
an accounting system, at least, to track the status quo (e.g., an 
actual cost system) is effective. 
Secondly, the results for the “stepwise refinement” and the 
“immediate adjustment” are rather similar for all scenarios 
under investigation. An obvious reason is that the “stepwise 
refinement” setting is modeled in a way that the decision-
makers get better knowledge of the fitness landscape relatively 
fast. The simulation of a slower learning curve might yield 
other results. 
Thirdly, “stepwise refinement” and “immediate adjustment” 
of knowledge about the fitness landscape bring performance to 
levels higher than achieved with “measurement only” -- except 
for the case of high complexity and decentral coordination 
which is discussed in section IV.C. Obviously, it is less likely 
TABLE II 
CONDENSED RESULTS 
 
     Low Complexity     High Complexity 
Name of Setting 
Speed 
(V5-V1) 
Final 
Performance 
(V300) 
Frequency of 
Global 
Maximum in 
t = 300 
Speed 
(V5-V1) 
Final 
Performance 
(V300) 
Frequency of 
Global 
Maximum in 
t = 300 
Decentral Mode       
(1) No measurement  0.04419  0.83689 1.66 % 0.12479 0.84374 1.94 % 
(2) Measurement only  0.05211 0.85251 1.94 % 0.12488 0.86941 3.16 % 
(3) Stepwise refinement  0.05734 0.89748 8.24 % 0.12818 0.86738 3.00 % 
(4) Immediate adjustment 0.05771 0.89381 7.76 % 0.12121  0.86519 3.46 % 
(5) Perfect evaluation  0.07321 0.89730 10.16 % 0.14536 0.86466 2.44 % 
Proposal Mode       
(1) No measurement  0.06878 0.83506 1.46 % 0.05739 0.83541 1.76 % 
(2) Measurement only  0.07277 0.85222 2.52 % 0.05754  0.83665 1.90 % 
(3) Stepwise refinement  0.08473 0.87681 4.84 %  0.06387 0.85041 2.30 % 
(4) Immediate adjustment  0.08601 0.87724 4.56 %  0.06742 0.84803 1.78 % 
(5) Perfect evaluation  0.09781 0.89518 9.54 %  0.06510 0.86716  2.40 % 
       
Notes: Each entry represents results of 5,000 adaptive walks: 1,000 distinct fitness landscapes with 5 adaptive walks on each 
over 300 periods. Confidence intervals for V300 at a confidence level of 0.001 range between 0.003 and 0.004. Common 
parameters in settings (1) to (4): 05.0ownr , 15.0
res
r  and 1.0main  (in (5) all set to 0); all errors with expected value 
 = 0. 
 -30- 
 
to opt for a false positive or false negative alternative within 
the adaptive walks in case of the immediate or stepwise 
improvement of judgmental information by actuals. This 
indicates that accounting systems which allow memorizing 
actual values contribute to higher performance levels. 
C. Effects of complexity and coordination mode 
The results provide broad support for intuition that increa-
sing accuracy of the management accounting systems captured 
in settings 1 to 5 leads to faster performance enhancements 
und higher levels of final performance. However, some results 
run contrary to intuition. In particular, the complexity of the 
interactions structure (i.e., coordination need) and the coor-
dination mode applied apparently interfere with the informa-
tion accuracy provided by the management accounting system. 
We start the discussion of the effects of coordination need 
and mode with the scenario of “low complexity-decentral 
mode” (Fig. 1A). In this case no cross-departmental inter-
actions exist. Therefore, no cross-departmental coordination is 
required: with imperfect judgmental information departments 
might decide in favor of a suboptimal partial option (false 
positive or false negative), but there are no external effects in 
the sense that this would reduce the performance of the other 
departments' decisions. The accounting systems 3 and 4, after 
around 75 periods in average reach the level of perfect 
information while systems 1 and 2 induce a rather high, nearly 
constant distance to perfect evaluations. 
To a certain extent, things seem to change for highly intense 
cross-departmental interactions among decisions (Fig. 2A). In 
particular, with decentral coordination for high complexity 
even the “measurement only” setting leads to performance 
levels beyond that achieved with perfect evaluations. Fig. 2A 
indicates that after around 50 to 75 periods the noisy 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Performance differences against perfect evaluations in case of no 
cross-departmental interactions 
Notes: The horizontal line at level 0 of the y-axis reflects the perfect 
evaluation and the other lines represent the performance differences in the 
course of the adaptive walks against the perfect management accounting 
system. Each line represents results of 5,000 adaptive walks: 1,000 distinct 
fitness landscapes with 5 adaptive walks on each over 300 periods. For 
parameter settings see Table 1 and notes to Table 2.  
 
 
Fig. 2.  Performance differences against perfect evaluations in case of 
maximum cross-departmental interactions 
Notes: The horizontal line at level 0 of the y-axis reflects the perfect 
evaluation and the other lines represent the performance differences in the 
course of the adaptive walks against the perfect management accounting 
system. Each line represents results of 5,000 adaptive walks: 1,000 distinct 
fitness landscapes with 5 adaptive walks on each over 300 periods. For 
parameter settings see Table 1 and notes to Table 2.  
International Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Interactive Multimedia, Vol. 2, Nº 4. 
 
-31- 
 
accounting systems with measurements of actuals (i.e. settings 
(2), (3) and (4) in table 1) exceed the performance achieved 
with perfect evaluations.  
In order to provide an explanation for this “beneficial” 
effect of noise we refer to “false positive” evaluations. Of 
course, with “false positives” an organization goes a “wrong 
way'' for a short term, but with the chance to discover superior 
configurations in a longer term [15], [34]. In particular, 
imperfect knowledge may afford the opportunity to leave a 
local peak in the fitness landscape. We argue that this effect is 
the more likely the more interactions among decisions exist: as 
is well investigated for the NK model in literature (e.g. [29], 
[30]), with higher levels of complexity the more rugged is the 
fitness landscapes and the more local maxima exist, and, 
hence, the search process is more likely to stick to a local 
maximum. Inaccuracies induce diversity in the search process, 
and “false positive” alterations, though short-term harmful, 
provide the chance to discover superior levels of performance 
and, eventually, the global maximum in the long-term. The 
results provide support for this intuition: In the “high 
complexity-decentral mode” scenario the relative frequency of 
how often the global maximum is found is lower with perfect 
evaluations than with noisy accounting systems as far as they 
measure the status quo. 
In the next step we analyze the role of the coordination 
mode. Firstly, results indicate that with the proposal mode (i.e., 
with involving the main office in decision-making) the range 
of differences in speed and level of performance among the 
various forms of management accounting systems. Hence, in a 
way, with introducing the information-processing power of the 
main office the relevance of the setting of the accounting 
system tends to be reduced.  
Secondly, our results (Fig. 1A versus 1B and Fig. 2A versus 
2B) also suggest that with inaccurate judgmental information 
in the proposal mode organizations miss the chance to achieve 
those performance levels that can be reached with perfect 
evaluations. In order to provide an explanation we find it 
helpful to remember that in the proposal mode the status quo 
only is abandoned if two conditions are met. First, at least, one 
department has to discover a partial vector that promises a 
higher compensation to the respective department head 
(otherwise he/she would not propose the alteration); second, 
the main office has to accept the proposal. Hence, for being 
implemented each proposal has to pass an additional instance 
and, hence, it is less likely that false positive evaluations on 
the departments' site affect final decisions since the main office 
may detect the false positive evaluations [22].  
However, by that, the “false positives” are less likely to do 
their beneficial work as discussed above. Furthermore, “false 
negative” evaluations by the main office might occur and the 
organization is more likely to suffer from inertia compared to 
the decentral mode. With more inertia the fitness landscape is 
less likely to be “explored” and this reduces benefits of the 
“stepwise refinement” and “immediate adjustment” accounting 
systems: To enfold the full potential of “learning” management 
accounting systems (settings 3 and 4) a certain exploration of 
the decisional space is required, which apparently might not be 
given in the proposal mode. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The results provide broad support for the intuition that 
improving judgmental information by measurements of actual 
values in management accounting systems leads to more 
effective adaptive search processes for higher levels of 
organizational performance.  
However, the results might throw some new light on basic 
design choices of management accounting systems: apparently, 
the contribution of improving information accuracy in 
management accounting systems subtly interferes with 
coordination need and mode. In particular, results do not 
universally support conventional wisdom that better account-
ting systems are more beneficial when decision-problems are 
highly complex. Furthermore, our results suggest that 
inaccuracies might have their positive sides compared to 
perfect information for complex decisions - given that 
inaccuracies are accompanied by decentral coordination.  
Moreover, it appears that with more central coordination the 
relevance of improving information quality in the management 
accounting system decreased. In short, to a certain extent 
management accounting systems and central coordination 
power seem to serve as substitutes. Hence, taking into account 
that improvements of management accounting systems usually 
are not costless, these findings put claims for investments in 
perspective.  
At the same time, our analysis is subject to several 
limitations which should be overcome in further research. First 
of all, it should be mentioned that in our model the 
contributions of management accounting systems to ex ante-
evaluations of alternatives is represented in a rather coarse 
way. Of course, more sophisticated learning and forecasting 
methods could be integrated (i.e., methods applied in plan cost 
accounting systems). Moreover, the ex ante-evaluations of our 
decision-makers suffer from imperfect knowledge about the 
“production functions” (in terms of the relation between choice 
and organizational outcome), but the model presented does 
neither reflect conflicts of interests nor decision-making under 
uncertainty. Obvious extensions of the model could overcome 
these shortages, especially in order to address the function of 
management accounting systems to update beliefs of decision-
makers as elaborated by Christensen [3].  
Furthermore, organizations apply various strategies and 
coordination modes to deal with imperfectly known 
“production functions”. In further extensions these strategies 
could be reflected in the model as well as the decision-making 
biases (e.g., status-quo bias) that decision-makers suffer from 
[11]. Including these aspects could reveal further insights into 
the relative benefits of basic design options of management 
accounting systems. 
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